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Preface 
This report synthesises the results of a workshop on explorative scenarios for the 
global social, economic, technological and political development from 2020 to 
2050. The 19 participants included national and international researchers and 
experts in the transdisciplinary Forum of the project – see 
http://www.ssb.no/en/forskning/energi-og-miljookonomi/klimapolitikk-og-
okonomi/smart-paths-smart-paths-and-costly-detours-towards-a-sustainable-low-
emission-society. The work resulted in a handful of alternative, internally 
consistent, qualitative scenarios for the forthcoming global social, economic, 
technological, and political development. These will serve as a starting point for 
the numerical scenarios to be generated and analysed in the project SMART PATHS 
(Research Council of Norway #268200). Thanks to workshop participants for this 
work being possible and for valuable input to this report. We also appreciate the 
comments on earlier drafts from Kristine Grimsrud and Cathrine Hagem and are 
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Abstract 
This report describes the approach and results of a scenario workshop for a 
transdisciplinary team of 18 experts held in the project SMART PATHS in June 
2017. The purpose was to span out a handful of alternative qualitative scenarios for 
the forthcoming global development. The specified question that the scenarios set 
out to shed light on is: what future external drivers are particularly decisive for the 
design and performance of national climate strategies in the period of 2020-2050? 
The work resulted in four, internally consistent, qualitative narratives of the global 
social, economic, technological, and political future and, in particular, of what they 
would mean for the external surroundings of the small, open Norwegian economy 
and its climate strategy ahead.  
 
The scenarios will be exploited in the remaining work of the research project 
SMART PATHS as a basis for quantitative global scenarios, which as a next step 
will be used to simulate how robust Norwegian climate strategies will be to 
variation in external impulses. Notwithstanding, the results from the workshop, 
summed up in this report, are useful in their own right for researchers and 
stakeholders studying the low-emission transformation. In a logical way, they span 
out a set of potential future worlds based on qualitatively different, equally 
plausible, outcomes of a few uncertain driving forces. 
 
The explorative scenario approach was based on the Probabilistic Modified Trends 
methodology (Amer, 2013; van der Heijden, 2005; Stoknes and Hermansen, 2004). 
It consists of three main working stages: (i) identifying driving forces for global 
changes ahead, (ii) discussing and assessing their uncertainty and impact, and (iii) 
systemising the driving forces into a few selected scenarios.  
 
During stage (i) around 60 proposed driving forces were collected, clustered and 
selected by the participants into 11 distinct factors assessed as the most significant 
and decisive. These included the strictness of a global climate treaty and of EU’s 
policies, the development of different technologies, the incidence of extreme 
weather events, energy demand, norms and preferences and the role of cities as 
political agents.  
 
Stage (ii) of assessing the drivers was performed in groups of 3-4 persons. The 
work involved judging how the driver was expected to develop and the degree of 
certainty of the outcome. The drivers with a low uncertainty are assumed to affect 
any future. The drivers with a high uncertainty and high impact, however, are 
considered critical or key drivers. They can take the future in very different 
directions. The assessment ranking resulted in these three drivers being critical, 
with fairly equal impact and uncertainty: the strictness of a global climate treaty, 
oil demand and norms and preferences. Their internal correlation implies that four 
scenarios materialise.  
 
The last step (iii) of the workshop was to “visit” these four scenarios, and describe 
the demographic, economic, political and technological aspects of these possible 
futures over time. The workshop described the following scenarios: Scenario A 
(SPLIT!) is characterised by a still sustained high demand for oil and other fossil 
fuels in the less developed world, while rapid evolvement of green norms and 
preferences takes place in the developed part of the world, including Norway. This 
is facilitated by compliant and ambitious treaties among the richer countries. The 
clue is that we get a split world with increasing tension between the regions.  
 
Scenario B (CLEAN!) resembles many of the existing scenario analyses of a 
successful transformation to a 2˚C world. It shows the coincidence of a rapid global 
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shift to green norms and preferences, significantly lower oil demand, and a 
compliant and ambitious climate agreement. Coordinated efforts worldwide 
alleviate the transformation process for Norway. Scenario C (DARK!) has the 
opposite characteristics. National security and near-term interests split the world, 
increase internal conflicts and result in severe climate change and expensive 
climate policies. Last, the occurrence of low oil demand despite only slow and 
insignificant changes in norms and preferences constitutes Scenario D (RICH!). 
The reduction of fossil fuels use is driven by renewable energy technologies 
breaking though and become highly competitive. The prosperity of the world is 
high, but unevenly distributed. The temperature rise is moderate. 
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Sammendrag 
Rapporten beskriver prosessen og resultatene fra et todagers arbeidsmøte i juni 
2017 med 18 forskere og eksperter fra prosjektet SMART PATHS. Formålet var å 
spenne ut noen alternative scenarioer for verdens utvikling fremover. Spørsmålet 
scenarioene er ment å svare på er hvilke fremtidige eksterne drivere som vil ha 
særlig innvirkning på hvordan utformingen og utfallet av Norges klimapolitikk blir 
i perioden 2020-2050. Arbeidet resulterte i fire internt konsistente fortellinger om 
fremtidens globale utvikling, beskrevet ved deres sosiale, økonomiske, 
teknologiske og politiske trekk, samt hvordan dette kan tenkes å virke inn på 
Norges klimastrategi.  
 
Scenarioene vil bli benyttet i det videre arbeidet innenfor forskningsprosjektet 
SMART PATHS som grunnlag for å kvantifisere globale scenarioer. Scenarioene vil 
så brukes til å simulere hvor robuste ulike klimastrategier for Norge vil være under 
ulike antakelser om den globale utviklingen. Resultatene fra det kvalitative 
scenarioarbeidet som rapporteres her har også nytte i kraft av seg selv. Til sammen 
representerer de en logisk sammenstilling av mulige utfall for viktige og usikre 
drivkrefter. Både forskere og andre eksperter som arbeider med omstillingen mot 
lavutslippssamfunnet vil ha nytte av slike konsistente beskrivelser av mulige 
framtider. 
 
Den eksplorative scenariotilnærmingen som ble benyttet er basert på metoden 
Probabilistic Modified Trends (Amer, 2013; van der Heijden, 2005; Stoknes and 
Hermansen, 2004). Den består av tre arbeidstrinn: (i) identifisering av drivkrefter 
for den globale utviklingen fremover, (ii) diskusjon og vurdering av deres på-
virkning og usikkerhet og (iii) ordning av drivkreftene i noen få, ulike scenarioer.  
 
Under trinn (i) ble rundt 60 drivkrefter foreslått, samlet i hovedgrupper og sorter 
etter signifikans. De 11 mest betydningsfulle ble plukket ut. De inkluderte styrken 
på internasjonale klimaavtaler og på Europas klimapolitikk, teknologiske 
utviklingstrekk, forekomsten av ekstreme værforhold, energipriser, normer og 
preferanser, samt rollen til byer som politiske aktører.  
 
Vurderingen av driverne i trinn (ii) ble utført i grupper på 3-4 personer. Hensikten 
med denne vurderingen var å undersøke hvor sterke drivkreftene var og hvor 
sikkert de ville slå til. Mens de mest sikre ble benyttet som fellestrekk for alle 
scenarioene, var rollen til de mest usikre å skille scenarioene fra hverandre. Disse 
vil kunne ta verden i helt ulike retninger. Vurderingen identifiserte tre av 
signifikante drivkreftene som de mest usikre: Styrken på en global klimaavtale, 
oljeetterspørsel og utviklingen av normer og preferanser.  
 
Da vi tok hensyn til korrelasjonene mellom drivkreftene, endte vi opp med fire 
scenarioer. Det siste trinnet av arbeidet (iii) var å beskrive scenarioenes ulike 
aspekter over tid, både demografiske, økonomiske, politiske og teknologiske. 
Scenario A (SPLIT!) beskriver en framtid der det fortsatt opprettholdes en høy 
etterspørsel etter olje og andre fossile brensler i den minst utviklede del av verden, 
mens det i de rikere landene, derunder Norge, skjer en rask endring mot grønne 
normer og preferanser. Det siste støttes opp av at landene inngår forpliktende og 
ambisiøse klimaavtaler seg imellom. Poenget er altså at verden følger to parallelle, 
motstridende spor. Spenningen øker mellom regionene.  
 
Scenario B (CLEAN!) ligner mange allerede foreliggende scenarioanalyser av 
hvordan verden når togradersmålet. Her faller tre, gjensidig forsterkende, 
utviklingstrekk sammen: Et raskt globalt skifte mot grønne normer og preferanser, 
betydelig lavere oljeetterspørsel og forpliktende, ambisiøse internasjonale 
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klimasamarbeid. Koordinert satsing mellom verdens land letter omstillings-
prosessen i Norge. Scenario C (DARK!) har de motsatte trekkene, noe som 
vanskeliggjør klimaarbeidet. Nasjonal sikkerhet og kortsiktige interesser blir 
viktigst og fører til internasjonale konflikter og dyr klimapolitikk. Det siste 
scenarioet D (RICH!) kjennetegnes av lav oljeetterspørsel, men samtidig trege og 
små endringer mot grønnere normer og preferanser. Forklaringen på redusert bruk 
av fossile brensler er at fornybare energiteknologier får robuste gjennombrudd og 
blir konkurransedyktige i store deler av verden. Velstanden blir høy i dette 
scenarioet, selv om store ulikheter består. Oppvarmingen av kloden blir moderat. 
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1. Introduction  
This report describes the approach and results of a scenario workshop held in the 
project SMART PATHS in June 2017. Participants were the research group plus 
experts from the business, government and research sector. The workshop 
constituted the first milestone of the project. The purpose was to span out a handful 
of alternative scenarios for the global development towards 2050, a year that 
Norway is aiming to having transformed to a low-emission society. Below, we 
introduce SMART PATHS and scenario-building task of the project, and we 
describe the main ideas behind the explorative scenario approach applied for the 
scenario work.  
1.1. SMART PATHS and scenarios 
Norway can choose different routes to the low-emission society. The project 
SMART PATHS aims to distinguish smart paths from costly detours. As the 
transition to a low-emission society will need up-front investments, new 
knowledge and changes in behaviour, decisions already today will form premises 
for the pathways Norway can take.  
 
The project is organised in three working packages (WPs). WP1 will identify the 
crucial external factors that the Norwegian climate strategies will have to relate to 
and assess their likely developments. External in this context does not mean that 
they are completely beyond control or independent of Norwegian decisions, but 
rather that they are exogenous to the domestic agents and mechanisms we model. 
WP1 will map global technological progress, demographical changes and 
international, particularly European, economic and political drivers. WP1 will also 
consider how social norms and attitudes might develop and their potential effects 
on consumer behaviour. At the following stage of WP1, the explorative scenarios 
will serve as a basis. The main research question to be studied by this qualitative 
approach is: What likely future external impulses are particularly decisive for the 
performance of national climate strategies? The drivers in each global scenario 
will be translated into relevant parameters and exogenous variables and quantified 
within two different global models. The first is an energy system model, which has 
its particular strength in capturing energy technological aspects of the scenarios. 
The other is a computational general equilibrium (CGE) model that focuses on how 
regional economic resources and trade relations among countries affect the 
economies. The two model traditions will complement each other in describing the 
scenarios. 
 
WP2 responds to the overarching objective of our proposal, which is to craft 
medium-term national climate strategies that will take us on a smart path to the 
low-emission society. This part of the project will largely be approached by model 
simulations of a country model for Norway. We see national ‘climate strategies’ as 
the combined choices of domestic emission targets, climate policy instruments and 
monitoring procedures underway to watch the transformation path. ‘Smart’ refers 
to climate strategies that are ‘persistent’, ‘cost-effective’ and ‘robust’.  By 
‘persistent’ we mean that emission abatement along the path should involve 
measures with longer-term transformation potential. We hypothesise that picking 
only low-hanging fruits in the nearer term would easily lead the society on a costly 
detour to the low-emission society, because sluggish investments and other 
behavioural responses can imply fossil-fuel lock-in. The ‘cost-effectiveness’ 
criterion will call for well-targeted policies to transcend the lock-in challenge. 
Finally, a ‘robust’ path is characterised by being smart even if external 
circumstances are changing. WP2 addresses all these three aspects of a ‘smart’ 
path.   
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The scenario workshop can be regarded as the first milestone in WP1 of 
qualitatively assessing how the world might develop, which will again be the basis 
for the research on ‘robust’ national climate strategies in WP2. Notwithstanding, 
the results from the workshop, summed up in this report, are useful in their own 
right. The results constitute a complementary set of four internally consistent 
narratives of the global development for the next 3-4 decades, and in particular, of 
what they imply for the climate strategy of the small, open Norwegian economy. 
Based on this report, the explorative scenarios will be communicated to Norwegian 
and international stakeholders.  
 
We concentrate on particularly decisive factors for the Norwegian climate 
strategies because the global scenarios will eventually be used to answer the 
following research question in WP2: How robust are Norwegian climate strategies 
to external impulses? A pivotal quality criterion for the domestic energy and 
climate policy design is its robustness to changes in global surroundings and other 
external conditions when it comes to effectively obtaining its objectives. This 
includes the ability of the economy to respond to such changes under various 
choices of policy instruments and targets. Some instruments can, for instance, be 
too tailored or too reliant on predictability to be effective under shifting 
circumstances.  
 
The project is linked to a Transdisciplinary Science-Policy Forum (the Forum) with 
a variety of backgrounds from the business, government and research sector. The 
experts are carefully picked to provide complementary competence to the project’s 
research team. The Forum will be involved from the outset and throughout the 
project to give input to research questions, approaches and communication of 
results. It will meet at least once a year with the whole project group and regularly 
be consulted when relevant to discuss approaches, progress and societal relevance. 
The workshop was the first occasion to have important input from the Forum; see 
Table 1.1 for the workshop participants.  
1.2. The explorative scenario workshop 
Strategic scenarios are narratives that explore possible and plausible futures. The 
main aim of scenario development is to give an in-depth, nuanced understanding of 
how key uncertainties in the decision makers’ surroundings may play out and 
impact the future outcomes of our current-day decisions.  
 
Hence, the aim of the SMART PATHS’ 2-days workshop was to work out a small 
number of explorative scenarios for how the global development can look like for 
the next 3-4 decades. The final scenarios will offer specific descriptions of 
different possible and plausible pathways for the external environment around 
Norway’s national climate strategies, like EU regulations, technology trends, 
learning curves, global cooperation, etc. A key point is that the scenarios are not 
predictions. Rather, each represents an internally consistent pathway to a clear and 
possible global future in 2050. As a set of four different scenarios, they span out 
potential future worlds based on qualitatively different, equally plausible, outcomes 
of a few uncertain driving forces.  
 
The explorative scenario approach is based on three main working stages: 
(i) Brainstorming, identifying and defining driving forces for global 
changes ahead, 
(ii) discussing and assessing their uncertainty and impact, and 
(iii) systemise the driving forces into a few selected scenarios. 
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With a broad, interdisciplinary team, it is possible to have a wide-ranging 
discussion of drivers and impacts of the global development for the next decades. 
Ideally, the inner diversity of the group’s ideas should match the diversity of the 
future domain being mapped. It is, thus, important to include drivers from 
technological, political, social, demographic and economic domains and involve 
experts that are well acquainted with these domains.  
 
The workshop was led and facilitated by PhD Per Espen Stoknes, Senior 
Researcher and Director of Center for Green Growth at BI, who is well 
experienced in similar applications of the method. The scenario method for the 
workshop was based on the Probabilistic Modified Trends (PMT) methodology 
(Amer, 2013; van der Heijden, 2005; Stoknes and Hermansen, 2004). See also the 
project description for SMART PATHS in the Appendix. 
 
The scenarios from the workshop are expected to form the basis for model 
simulations of alternative global futures and the implications for the Norwegian 
societal and economic development. Besides being valuable research contributions 
in themselves (presented below in 4.2), the outcomes of the workshop and the 
simulated scenarios will be pivotal for investigating how Norwegian climate 
strategies perform within different external settings. This is one of the research 
questions in the project SMART PATHS (especially in the Work Package 1).  
Table 1.1 List of workshop participants  
Surname First name Institution Position 
Aslaksen  Iulie SSB Senior Researcher 
Bye Brita SSB Senior Researcher 
Böhringer Christoph University of Oldenbourg Professor 
Cuesta Helena Cabal Ciemat Senior Researcher 
Ditlev-Simonsen Caroline D BI Associate Professor 
Fæhn Taran SSB Senior Researcher 
Gade Henrik Miljødirektoratet Chief Engineer 
Greaker Mads SSB Senior Researcher 
Lind  Arne Institutt for energiteknikk (IFE) Senior Researcher 
Lindegaard Are Miljødirektoratet Senior Climate Advicer 
Løfsnes Ole Norsk Industri Senior Expert 
Rosnes Orvika SSB Researcher 
Seljom Pernille Institutt for energiteknikk (IFE) Researcher 
Skjærseth Jon Birger FNI  Senior Researcher 
Stene Janne Stortinget Political Advisor 
Stoknes Per Espen BI Director 
Storrøsten Halvor SSB Senior Researcher 
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2. Scenario question, strategy scope and target 
group 
2.1. The scenario question 
The scenario question is a question that guides the scenario research and writing. 
Each of the selected scenarios will formulate one, specific answer to the same 
question. Yet each scenario will be fundamentally different from the others.  
 
The scenario question was taken from the project description, discussed and 
adjusted somewhat by the team. The final formulation of the scenario question is:  
 
What future external drivers are particularly decisive for the design and 
performance of national climate strategies in the period of 2020-2050?  
 
Subsequent quantification of the scenarios by means of numerical global models is 
an important aim of the qualitative scenario building process. The qualitative 
scenario descriptions are useful for determining exogenous variables in a consistent 
manner in the numerical modelling. Conversely, the quantitative model results will 
be useful for checking the implications of the qualitative reasoning in the 
explorative phase. Thus, iterations between qualitative descriptions and 
quantitative modelling are both wanted and necessary in rigorous scenario 
development to obtain reasonable and consistent scenarios. See chapter 6 for 
further elaboration on quantification.  
2.2. The strategy scope and target group 
One key insight from experience with and research on strategic scenarios is that it 
is essential to be clear and thorough on the specific use of the scenario set before 
the scenario development starts. This means to be explicit on the decision-making 
process that will employ the scenarios, and who the sponsors/owners and other 
stakeholders involved in the decision-making process are (Lindgren 2014, Stoknes 
and Hermansen 2004, van der Heijden 2005).  
 
After discussion in the scenario team and the project forum group, the following 
strategy scope was formulated and agreed upon: 
 
The purpose and the use of these scenarios is to provide (high-quality) 
research that can inform the Norwegian policy-making during the time 
period 2019-2023 in its design of a robust national climate and energy 
strategy to reach the low-emission society (including the formulation of the 
new Norwegian NDC to the 2023 COP1).  
 
The key target groups for the scenarios and the research results to emerge from 
them were identified to include Norwegian decision-makers and opinion as well as 
the international research community.  
 
Among Norwegian stakeholders in the target group are:  
- ministries, parliamentarians, The Norwegian Environmental Agency 
(MDIR) 
- businesses, labour unions and NGOs 
- public media and communication fora 
                                                     
1 NDCs are the Nationally Determined Contributions decided by each nation participating in the 
Conferences Of the Parties (COPs) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The first NDCs and the further process were negotiated at COP21 and constitute the 
Paris climate agreement.   
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The research community is the primary target group for the results of the project-
internal use of the explorative scenarios in SMART PATHS. Here, the first objective 
will be to exploit the scenarios as a basis for a complementary set of quantitative 
global scenarios. They will aim at complementing the five Shared Socio‐Economic 
Pathways (SSPs) developed to facilitate the integrated analysis of future climate 
impacts, vulnerabilities, adaptation, and mitigation; see O’Neill et al. (2017). 
Previous comparable pathway studies include Nakicenovic and Swart (2000) and 
IPCC (2014). The scenarios to be developed will focus on medium-term 
quantitative implications and on differences in countries’ preconditions and 
objectives. Energy systemic and technological aspects will be accounted for 
through simulations of a global energy system model (ETSAP-TIAM; Loulou 
(2008); Loulou and Labriet, 2008). These aspects will be combined with other 
socio-economic characteristics that will be quantified by means of a global 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) model (SNOW; Böhringer et al., 2012; 
Böhringer et al., 2015) that accounts for how regional economic resources and 
trade relations among countries affect the economies at large.  
 
The second use of the scenarios will involve designing robustness tests of selected 
national climate strategies by means of a country model for Norway (SNOW-NO). 
A pivotal quality criterion for the domestic energy and climate policy design is 
how robust it is to the changes in global surroundings and other external conditions 
when it comes to effectively obtaining its objectives. This includes how flexible the 
economy will likely respond to such changes under various choices of policy 
instruments and targets.  
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3. Drivers 
Framing and scoping the analysis of driving forces by reviewing the 
past  
When thinking and analysing the coming 20-30 years, it is often useful to review 
what has happened duringa previous time period of the same length. Since 
scenarios are about exploring uncertainties and discontinuities, it is particularly 
useful to reflect on what driving forces for change that were underestimated by the 
‘conventional wisdom’ of Norwegian policy makers at the beginning of the 
previous time period. This may provide us with insights into how mainstream 
thoughts are locked into certain patterns of perception, leading to skewed 
assumptions and biases when – in the past – trying to think ahead towards today.  
 
The team was therefore given the task of coming up with issues and/or driving 
forces for change that – in their individual view – was underestimated or 
overlooked by mainstream thinkers and analysts around 25 years ago, i.e., since 
1992.  After some time for individual reflection, each participant was invited to 
write down two such underestimated drivers on two post-its. They could then come 
forward to present these two while attaching them to the whiteboard. A rapid 
clustering – based on facilitated plenary discussion – was performed both during 
and afterwards of this plenary discussion.  
 
What follows are the results, in the form of a clustered list, that emerged during 
this group session on the past:  
 
“What was underestimated by Norwegian policy makers 25 years ago (i.e. since 
around 1992)?” (in non-prioritised order): 
- Growth of emerging economies, particularly China 
- How difficult it has been to negotiate a global climate treaty on global CO2 
price 
- The political determination to continue annual climate negotiations 
- The resilience and persistence of fossil fuels (no production ‘peak oil’) 
- The incredible speed of digital technology change 
- The recent growth of electric cars and cost reductions on batteries 
- The possibility of another severe and long-term global financial recession 
- The large and rapid price drops on solar and wind  
- The broad (scientific) acceptance of global warming seriousness 
- The persistence of rebound effects.  
On this historical background, the group was invited to explore – by divergent 
thinking – the future. Each individual in the highly interdisciplinary team was 
invited to come up with 4 suggestions of external driving forces that will impact 
the Norwegian climate policy and strategies in the future leading up to 2050. Two 
of the four could be more well-known and acknowledged, while the next two could 
be more uncertain, novel or possibly unexpected according to current 'conventional 
wisdom’. 
 
With 15 participants and 4 driving forces each, around 60 proposed driving forces 
were collected on a shared wall space, each one represented by a post-it note, and 
each of them verbally presented and explained to the plenary group. During the 
presentation obvious overlaps and related drivers were clustered by proximity on 
the wall.  
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After this divergent, creative process of exploring a broad range of possible future 
driving forces, the process turned around towards convergent and more evaluative 
thinking. Each participant was then asked to review the entire wall, and given 3 
votes. After time for reflection, these 3 votes from each participants were expressed 
as pen-tip marks on the post-it cluster they were deeming to be the most significant 
and decisive drivers.  
 
Through this process, 11 distinct drivers emerged from the full range of 60, each of 
these 11 with several votes (or at least one). These selected 11 were then subject to 
further elaboration, discussion and definition in smaller groups of 3 or 4 people. A 
shared Google-sheets document was used for capturing the shared knowledge in 
the team regarding these 11 drivers. Each driver was then fleshed out by one of the 
groups. The group’s task was to formulate the following characteristics for each 
driver: 
• driver name 
• definition 
• future impacts 
• strengthening/accelerating factors  
• weakening/counteracting factors 
• assessment of the degree of certainty of the driver and the two extreme 
outcomes, if uncertain 
Table 2.1 sums up the 11 drivers, their impacts and assessments, as they were 
elaborated on by the groups. The following subsections 3.1-3.11 give more 
thorough and refined descriptions. 
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Table 3.1 Summary of impacts and assessment of drivers  
Driver name Future impacts Certainty assessment 
#1 Strong Climate Treaties Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments 
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement abroad  
New innovation and business opportunities 
No carbon leakage 
Uncertain 
(ambitious & compliant vs. 
unambitious or uncompliant) 
#2 Clean technology development Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments 
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement abroad  
New innovation and business opportunities 
Uncertain 
(weak vs. strong) 
 
#3 Power storage technology development Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments  
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement abroad 
New innovation and business opportunities 
Uncertain 
(weak vs. strong) 
 
#4 Extreme weather events Reconstruction and adaptation costs 





#5 Strong EU policy Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments  
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement in the EU and RoW 
CO2 pricing 
Certain 
#6 Lower oil demand Drop in oil price and petroleum profitability 
Less exploration and extraction 
Uncertain 
(high vs. low) 
#7 Increased electricity demand Higher European/Norwegian electricity prices 
Loss of competitiveness for energy-intensive 
manufacturing 
More cross-border grids 
Energy security and distribution concerns 
Certain 
#8 Green norms and preferences Consumption sufficiency, leisure demand, sharing 
economy 
Less energy demand, particularly fossil fuels 
Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments 
Uncertain 
(rapid vs. slow) 
#9 Cities as political agents Novel technological and structural solutions 
Shifts in consumption/modes of living 
Local differences  
Certain 
#10 Technological success of CCS Higher global commitments 
Higher Norwegian commitments 
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement abroad 
Global fossil fuel demand 
High oil price and petroleum profitability 
Continued exploration and extraction 
Uncertain  
(Success vs. failure) 
#11 Evolvement of the digital economy  Benefits the greening of the economy:  
Cheaper abatement domestically 
Cheaper abatement abroad 
New innovation and business opportunities 
Certain 
3.1. #1 Strong climate treaties  
This possible driving force for change, #1 Strong climate treaties, is defined by that 
in the coming global stocktake by 2023 in the wake of the Paris agreement, 
commitments will be taken on by most of the world’s countries and be consistent 
with the 2 ̊C, or possibly a 1.5  ̊C, target. That means that the world will be on the 
track to the goal set in the 2016 Paris agreement. The 2023 negotiations may thus 
force Norway to take on larger commitments by 2030 than in the original Paris 
agreement. The low-emission goal from 2050 may also have to be strengthened. 
  
For the Norwegian climate strategies, the main impacts will be that the global 
development of low and zero-emission technologies will be spurred. Technological 
development facilitates access to cheap and effective abatement options for 
Norwegian firms and households. The same applies to other countries. The treaty 
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A broad participation by countries setting curbing, even if some set relative lax, 
national targets will also mean that we will avoid carbon leakage from national and 
European abatement. Even if competitiveness can be lost to foreign firms with 
laxer regulations, their binding national targets will keep total emissions in their 
jurisdiction unaltered through bringing about mitigation in other parts of their 
economies. 
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The plausibility of strong treaties will be 
strengthened if for some reason particularly effective abatement options are 
invented and effectively spread. Other accelerating factors would be the leadership 
by large, influential countries or if global institutions are established that help 
compliance and enforcement of the treaties. 
 
On the other hand, if further technological development is slow, or if no global 
institutions or strong powers ensure compliance, strong treaties will become less 
likely. The EU, China and the US are examples of actors that could take leadership. 
Their willingness and capability will weaken in case of other challenges crowding 
out the climate change issue, like economic crises, geopolitical conflicts or acute 
natural disasters.  
 
Certainty assessment: Just as likely as the driver #1 Strong climate treaties that are 
ambitious and compliant for most nations of the world is the opposite outcome of 
unambitious and non-compliant treaties, possibly only involving few countries. 
3.2. #2 Clean technology development 
Technological development can facilitate inexpensive and effective abatement. We 
can even develop effective methods for obtaining negative emissions (e.g., 
BECCS2). As described above, technological development gives access to cheap 
and effective abatement options, which makes ambitious targets easier to set and 
reach.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The development and marketing of new 
technologies can achieve more political and financial support if business and 
employment opportunities are attached. This also applies to the innovation that take 
place within domestic borders. For an effective growth in green technologies, it is 
important that both the climate and technology policies are predictable, stable and 
long-lasting. Ideally, policies promoting Research and Development (R&D) should 
be coordinated and funding pooled and competed for internationally. Facilitating 
the spread of technologies and international funding of technological transfer to 
less developed, growing economies will also accelerate the green technological 
transformation. For some technological development, learning by deploying would 
be a crucial element.  
 
Potential obstacles to a rapid green technological change are protectionist trends in 
world trade or other political priorities in national and geopolitics, novel sources or 
technologies for cheap extraction of fossil resources and/or limited technological 
steps resulting from green R&D. 
 
Certainty assessment: The driver #2 Clean technology development can range from 
weak to strong. 
3.3. #3 Power storage technology development 
This driver embraces all new technologies offering inexpensive possibilities to 
level out fluctuations in the European (and global) electricity supply. Batteries, as 
                                                     
2 Bio-Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage technologies 
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well as solutions involving storage and electricity supply by prosumers3, will 
enable economies to rely more heavily on renewable electricity generation and can 
help the electrification of energy services hitherto based on fossil fuels, like 
transportation. Since the Norwegian power generation is already clean, a battery 
revolution would, first of all, alter the Norwegian economy by dampening the role 
of Norwegian hydropower and Norwegian fossil fuels in European energy mix. 
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The accelerators and obstacles for the 
development of power storage technologies will largely be similar to those of clean 
technology development, in general (see driver #2). A characteristic of the storage 
technologies is their reliance on advanced infrastructure investments and market 
designs (intelligent net and smart grids). Here, the governments will have to play a 
role in coordinating/facilitating and/or funding investments. For example, existing 
regulations can hamper novel solutions and will have to be altered. The 
transformation can be blocked by incumbent power companies afraid of losing 
market positions; these can include Norwegian market players within hydropower 
and fossil fuels. Improved energy efficiency and active demand management can 
reduce the need for storage along with the need for renewable power.   
 
Certainty assessment: The driver #3 Power storage technology development can 
range from weak to strong. 
3.4. #4 Extreme weather events  
The driver includes weather events expected to become more frequent because of 
climate change, like water deficiency, draught, flooding and sliding. Episodes of 
regional food shortage, migration and conflicts will become more frequent. The 
need for emergency aid and adaptation investments from richer parts of the world 
will escalate, and so will the migration pressure to areas of the globe that are richer, 
more adapted or less exposed to natural disasters due to climate change like Europe 
and Norway.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The frequency of extreme weather events 
will also rise within Norway and Europe, diverting policies and resources towards 
repairs, maintenance and adaptation. However, the focus on mitigation and global 
cooperation can also be strengthened along with more evident impacts of climate 
change. The Norwegian economy can see some gains from a wetter climate in 
terms of hydropower and food production.  
 
If climate change implies a melting of permafrost and/or the Pole ice, extreme 
weather events can be expected to accelerate further. The consequences of climate 
change can be dampened if societies are prepared and adapted to natural events and 
emergency situations, if the events strengthen global mitigation efforts and 
cooperation, if affordable technologies and the capacity to make use of them are 
readily available both for mitigation and adaptation.   
 
Certainty assessment: The increased occurrence of the driver #4 Extreme weather 
events is regarded as certain. 
3.5. #5 Strong EU policy 
This driver involves Europe being a leading region for mitigation policy and a 
proactive power in international negotiations and central funder of technological 
transfer and adaptation efforts in less developed regions. For the Norwegian 
                                                     
3 Prosumers refer to individuals and households that are not only consuming electricity, but are also 
producing and selling excess power to the network for example originating from solar sources and/or 
stored in electric car batteries.   
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climate strategies, EU policies are decisive for lowering the costs, increasing the 
effects and keeping up the ambitions. The EU emission trading system (ETS) 
relieves the pressure on national industries and facilitates CO2 pricing. If the EU 
succeed to establish similar arrangements for emissions outside the ETS, 
Norwegian ambitions will be easier to meet.   
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The stringency of EU policy will be 
stimulated if cheaper abatement options develop, if Europe succeeds to establish 
fair and acceptable distributional mechanisms and/or if economic prosperity grows 
in the region. On the other hand, the EU climate ambitions are at risk if the political 
and economic conditions worsen and contribute to disintegrate the union. Conflicts 
and crises will lend less priority to the climate issue. Disintegration can make each 
country more self-centred and concerned with being self-sufficient in energy and 
food supply. Their national actions can easily render short-sighted, cost-driving and 
reduce welfare levels.  
 
Certainty assessment: We regard the driver #5 Strong EU policy as reasonably 
certain.  
3.6. #6 Lower oil demand  
Lower oil demand will be the result to the extent that alternative energy supply 
flourishes, fuel efficiency improves and fuel subsidies are phased out in the world. 
The most direct result for the Norwegian economy will be relatively lower oil 
prices and, hence, lower profitability of the petroleum sector.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The decline in oil demand will be 
accelerated if effective renewable technologies, storage solutions and market 
designs evolve rapidly. One precondition will be active and focussed governments, 
which again depend on how severe climate change is regarded relative to other 
societal challenges. Rapid economic growth in 3rd world countries will tend to 
increase oil demand, particularly if combined with sluggish renewable energy 
development and lack of international cooperation and low or no carbon pricing. 
 
Certainty assessment: The prospect of #6 Lower oil demand is uncertain. We can 
face a future with continued high fossil fuel reliance where renewables come on 
top of fossils or a future where the energy system is based on renewables and 
energy-efficiency that replace oil demand globally.  
3.7. #7 Increased electricity demand 
The demand for electricity increases as a consequence of the electrification of 
transportation and heating services in Europe. In Norway, the rise will mainly take 
place in transportation. The results will be higher European (and Norwegian) 
electricity prices, loss of competitiveness for power-intensive industries and 
potentially more reliance on imports and cross-border grid structures. The issue of 
energy security, high energy prices and distribution will be on the political agenda.   
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: Electricity demand will be strengthened by 
governmental involvement in the electrification shift, e.g., by continuing the 
Norwegian electric vehicle policies. The pressure on the electricity price pressure 
will be enhanced if Europe simultaneously faces a rapid population growth through 
immigration or increased economic wealth of the inhabitants. On the other hand, 
electrifications will be slowed down if costs of clean power technologies and/or 
battery technology do not come down and/or if consumers/voters are reluctant to 
take on the high costs. Rapidly improving energy-efficiency in the buildings sector 
may reduce electricity demand significantly. There might also evolve other 
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alternatives to electrification that turn out to be less costly/more acceptable, like 
fuel efficiency, biofuels and hydrogen/fuel cells in transportation.   
 
Certainty assessment: #7 Increased electricity demand seems to be unavoidable 
towards 2050 both in light of the electrification process already evolving and 
because of a general growth in the European income and population.  
3.8. #8 Green norms and preferences 
This driver is defined as consumers (particularly in Europe) changing what they 
want, how and when they want it in a green direction. Consumption sufficiency 
replaces consumption growth as a driving force and leisure is more emphasised at 
the expense of consuming (more) resource-intensive goods and services. For 
instance, people demand increased flexibility in energy and transport use and focus 
on the longevity of products. The demand will fall for energy, particularly fossil 
fuels, and also for goods that rely on energy in their provision. Demand for sharing 
services etc. will increase. People are highly aware of the climate change issue. 
This also implies a broader social support for strong public policy.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: Green norms and preferences will be 
strengthened if social structures and societal solutions arise to preserve and 
reinforce them. Examples would be the evolvement of institutions for sharing 
economy, infrastructures supportive of new city life styles and the facilitation for 
people who seek simpler lifestyles in rural areas. Europe encompasses a large 
variety of norms, attitudes and values today. For green norms and preferences to 
strengthen, current trends most noticeably found in Germany and France need to be 
reinforced and diffused to more of the region, including Norway. 
 
Transformation of attitudes can be inhibited if individual habits are persistent by 
nature, if they depend on rigid structures and/or if policies – or lack of policies – 
favour the choices that continue to make use of existing technologies and 
infrastructures. 
 
Certainty assessment: The cultural transformation towards #8 Green norms and 
preferences can be rapid or slow.  
3.9. #9 Cities as political agents 
Cities will take on the role as important agents for change in Europe and Norway. 
Political actors at city level or regional level actively develop their own policies, 
gain more power (e.g. through covenants among mayors, spillover effects to other 
cities, and also nudging policies at the national level). The impacts in a Norwegian 
context will be that novel technological and structural solutions evolve at local 
levels, leading to potentially large shifts in the modes of living in cities. The 
changes will be most marked for consumers (as opposed to firms).  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The transformation of cities will be 
accelerated if consumers actively take part and demand coordinated action from 
their communities. The triggers can be high local pollution levels, congestion 
problems or other local environmental challenges related to greenhouse gas 
emissions. The cities’ action can also accelerate if there are conflicts between the 
state and local level interests or if the national government is weak. Green norms 
and preferences will interplay with and residually reinforce the local level policy 
actions (see driver #8).  
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Certainty assessment: #9 Cities as political agents will expectedly be a significant 
feature of international climate and energy policy development and 
implementation.  
3.10. #10 Technological success of CCS 
CCS can become a commercial success if there are sufficiently high carbon prices, 
rapid technological progress and public acceptance. The direct impact on the 
Norwegian climate strategy will be that mitigating emissions from Norwegian 
manufacturing and petroleum activities becomes relatively inexpensive. Globally, 
CCS will be most important for fossil-fuelled power plants. CCS will increase the 
feasibility of ambitious targets both at a national and global level, including 
ambitions for gross, and even net, negative emissions in some countries within a 
few decades.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The probability of rapid development and 
wide-spread deployment of CCS will increase only if the world makes use of high 
carbon prices, if the technology is publicly accepted and legalised in terms of 
pipeline and storage safety and storage capacity, and if the costs of capturing, 
transportation and storage are driven down. Otherwise, CCS will not be a 
significant part of the climate change response.  
 
Certainty assessment: Both #10 Technological success of CCS, as well as its 
failure, are likely future outcomes. 
3.11. #11 Evolvement of the digital economy 
The digital economy is generic, including development of internet (fiber), big data, 
robotisation, internet of things, and with massive and cheap data collection and 
analysis. It will benefit all parts of the society, also the greening of the economy. 
An obvious benefit is better monitoring, which will allow efficient energy 
consumption (smart grids, prosumer patterns, easier transition to high renewable 
energy share). It will also be part of a large range of new, greener business models 
(sharing economy, robotisation, skype meetings, etc.). The digital possibilities 
represent an economic game changer. In all sectors of the economy the ultimatum 
will be “go digital or die”.  
 
There are large potentials for making use of the general digitalisation of the society 
to reinforce the greening potential. For instance, internet (fiber), big data and 
computation capacity can be used to establish new, and better informed, value 
chains. Digitalisation may offer large network and scale economies.  
 
Strengthening and weakening factors: The speed of the digital revolution can be 
deterred by rules of data security, privacy protection and other law issues. There 
are risks of cyber attacks, cyber terrorism and break-down of key societal systems. 
Power groups in the established value chains can work against the new businesses. 
There is also the risk of cheaper and more attractive options having 
counterproductive rebound effects in terms of emissions. Economic growth, more 
available goods and services via interne, attractive innovations in gadgets and 
technical equipment, etc., can increase the volume of consumption.  
 
Certainty assessment: There is little uncertainty about the driver #11 Evolvement 
of the digital economy –it will continue. 
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3.12. Other drivers revisited  
At the workshop participants discussed, though less systematically, drivers that 
were not independently mentioned and analysed in the list above. These were: 
- New, sudden technological breakthroughs (black swans), 
- General economic and financial growth versus long-term crisis (the 
relative growth of green versus other economic sectors is important, not 
green growth per se),  
- Social norms and structures in addition to the more individually reliant #8 
Green norms and preferences above, 
- The development in other regions than Europe,  
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4. Defining scenarios 
4.1. Choosing the axes and scenarios  
The driving forces described in chapter 3 are the building blocks of scenarios. Each 
driver has a certain impact on the scenario question: “the design and performance 
of national climate strategies in the period of 2020-2050?” Each driver also has 
inherent uncertainty as it plays out towards 2050. The scenarios are constructed 
from a set of driving forces, in which the driving forces are combined in a 
consistent manner: 
 
Drivers with a low uncertainty (i.e. fairly certain), are used as a common 
foundation for all the scenarios. That is because their impacts are expected to play 
out in any future. The drivers with a high uncertainty and high impact, however, 
are considered critical or key drivers. The highly uncertain impacts of these drivers 
can take the future in very different directions. In this scenario method, we 
construct scenarios by using the certain drivers in all scenarios, while using the 
uncertain drivers as one particular impact in one scenario, and the opposite impact 
in another scenario. See Figure 4.1 below: 
Figure 4.1 Building of scenarios based on drivers 
 
 
After the drivers were defined at the workshop, they were ranked according to 
impact and uncertainty. This was done in an iterative process, first at sub-group 
level, then plenary level, and refined in a second discussion.  
 
This driver ranking work resulted in the selection of the following drivers as 
“certain” (or “low uncertainty”):  
#4   Extreme weather events (see Section 3.4) 
#5   Strong EU policy (see Section 3.5) 
#7   Increased electricity demand (see Section 3.7) 
#9   Cities as political agents (see Section 3.9) 
#11 Evolvement of the digital economy (see Section 3.11) 
 
These five drivers (high impact, low uncertainty) become the common foundation 
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The ranking also resulted in picking these three drivers as key drivers with equally 
high impact and high uncertainty:  
 #1 Strong Climate Treaty (see Section 3.1)  
#6 Lower oil demand (see Section 3.6) 
#8 Green norms and preferences (see Section 3.8) 
 
In the workshop discussion, we concluded that there are correlations between these 
drivers. First, #8 Green norms and preferences will lead to #1 Strong climate 
treaties, and the more rapid shift of norms and preferences the more compliant and 
ambitious treaties will result, and vice versa. Second, #6 Lower oil demand would 
make #1 Strong climate treaties more likely, as well as the opposite causal 
direction; the more compliant and ambitious the climate treaties, the more will oil 
demand go down.  
 
Therefore, we decided to use #6 Lower oil demand and #8 Green norms and 
preferences as main axes in the scenario uncertainty space as illustrated in Figure 
4.2, while #1 Strong climate treaty is inserted as a third, diagonal axis impacting 
only two of the main quadrants in Figure 4.2.  
Figure 4.2 Axes of the scenarios  
 
 
Based on this structure, we get four scenarios; one in each quadrant formed by the 
main axes. The final step of the workshop was to “visit” these four quadrants, and 
describe the scenarios that can emerge towards 2050, if the future heads in this 
direction. In Figure 4.3 below, the diagonal axis, #8 Strong climate treaties, is not 
explicitly shown in the figure with the names of the scenario. This is just to make 
the figure design visually simpler, i.e., less cluttered. 
4.2. Description of the scenarios 
Given the axes as depicted in Figure 4.2., the workshop participants were split in 
four groups, each given the task of describing one of the scenarios. The scenarios 
were coined SPLIT!, CLEAN!, DARK! and RICH!. Figure 4.3 illustrates the 
scenario logic and the subsequent sections sum up the scenario characteristics. We 
structure their descriptions into three chronological periods, one covering each 
decade of the period 2020-2050. (The scenario text is organised in variables/trends 
rather than in chronological periods, as variable-wise is how the exogenous 
assumptions will be fed into the model in subsequent work packages.) 
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Figure 4.3 The four scenarios  
 
4.2.1. SPLIT!  
In this future world, we get a split development with two simultaneous and 
opposing tracks on energy and climate. Despite a public shift to #8 Green norms 
and preferences, the global #6 oil demand remains high, particularly in emerging 
economies. The most prosperous countries see a rapid shift to green norms and 
keep a quick pace towards low emission societies. This is mutually reinforced by 
climate treaties among the richer countries and cities. However, the less wealthy 
part of the world is mostly passively associated with the international climate 
efforts. Their primary focus is on rapid economic growth, and they allow 
themselves lax, if any, emission targets. Climate policies are virtually absent in 
these countries and their considerable need for energy relies heavily on cheap fossil 
fuels.  
 
The split leads to increasing tensions between the relatively rich and poor people 
and regions, making mitigation efforts regionally concentrated. Continued fossil-
fuel reliance and successful lobbying in other regions undermine the efforts to get 
strong global climate treaties in place. By 2050, the world faces severe climate 
disruptions, economic contraction and frequent political conflicts.   
Population, growth and climate change 
The first ten years of this scenario, from 2020 to 2030, is mostly prosperous. Both 
in the Western hemisphere and in developing countries there is large economic 
optimism, which is reflected differently: In the richer part of the world, the climate 
change awareness is high and businesses see opportunities for profitable green 
entrepreneurship. The labour force is well-educated and innovative. The optimism 
in lower-income countries is based on high growth rates and large consumption 
demand. Population growth also remains high in many of the latter regions, like 
Nigeria and India.  
 
Gradually, the growth is hampered by climate change such as droughts, food 
scarcity, natural disasters and substantial public expenses in emergency aid, 
infrastructure maintenance and adaptation efforts. The crises also reduce 
population growth rates in the suffering regions. Towards 2050, living standards 
stop increasing and start falling in more and more parts of the world.  
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We see conflicts due to migration and cultural clashes and struggles over access 
and control over water, food and energy resources, that eventually also limit 
growth in the relatively wealthier parts of the world. The Western hemisphere has 
an economy increasingly based on green norms and values. However, the ideas of 
international cooperation start to fade, and along with conflicts over trade and 
migration control, the Western countries become more self-supported and isolated. 
Even local communities start isolating themselves and fighting for regional power 
with the national authorities and with each other.  
 
Climate change is severe by the end of the period. By 2050 the temperature has a 
clearly increasing trend and on track for a global warming increase of 3˚C.  
International cooperation and geopolitics 
In the second decade – from 2030 to 2040 – the world’s most prosperous countries 
continue their quick pace towards digitally advanced, low-emission societies. 
Their ambitions rely on international cooperation and agreements. Europe is 
integrating closer and has fruitful cooperation with China and several smaller, 
proactive economies, like Canada and Australia. Also, the most ambitious US’ 
states and cities cooperate. However, the US federal government, along with the 
lion-share of the emerging and developing countries takes little or no part in the 
international efforts. Their political focus is elsewhere, on growth, conflicts and 
instability. Propaganda and fake news continue to link climate concerns to 
conspiracies.  
 
There is tension between the green innovative economies and the others because 
of counteracting development paths. In the last decade to 2050, as global warming 
and extreme weather events get increasingly urgent and far-reaching, this deepens 
the conflicts over poverty and inequality. The border policies of the European and 
other Western countries reinforce political and cultural polarisation of the world. 
Also, within borders conflicts arise because the materialist lifestyles in the South 
and the environmental-friendly lifestyle of the North are challenged by lack of 
financial and natural resources. 
 
This SPLIT! scenario, which started out rather happily, turns difficult for a 
majority of people during the 2040-2050 period because of declining average 
living standards, strong inequality and large climate change consequences. 
Technology development 
Overall, in the SPLIT! world, there is fast development in green technology in 
Europe and their climate mitigation allies, including China, but slower in US and 
developing countries. During 2020-2030, development and deployment of solar 
and wind energy will rise substantially. Several pilot CCS projects will be 
launched. Technological growth in the climate-policy-lax countries will, 
primarily, be driven by adoption of solutions that increase labour productivity. 
Technologies that facilitate climate adaptation will also be in demand, particularly 
in the Southern hemisphere. Thus, advanced technologies and expertise in 
adaptation strategies will also form part of the green growth in Europe and China. 
Since global oil demand is considerable, high-tech exploration and extraction 
technologies will also find their way to the boiling market. 
 
The diffusion of renewable technologies will continue in the 2030-2050 period to 
the extent that solutions are available and perceived privately competitive. Already 
by 2030, European abatement innovations, and in particular their advancements in 
CCS – to some extent also in bio-CCS, face market limitations as the rest of the 
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world is not following up the mitigation efforts. However, the market-pull in 
adaptation technologies strengthens.  
 
Energy mix 
In SPLIT! the energy-mix is by 2050 markedly divided in two: In Europe and the 
other climate-concerned countries, the share of renewables is high and increasing 
along the period, driving out fossils. In much of rest of the world including the 
US, the growth in renewables comes on top of a still a high fossil fuel reliance. 
This is held up by exploiting novel, unconventional sources and policy support for 
fields with relatively costly extraction.  
4.2.2. CLEAN!   
In the CLEAN! future, we see the convergence of a rapid global shift to #8 Green 
norms and preferences with significantly #6 Lower oil demand and #1 strong 
climate treaties. The latter drivers are reinforced by rapid development of cheap, 
low-carbon technologies. The result is that fossil fuels become ever less 
competitive, leaving the global demand for oil and other fossil fuels at very low 
levels by 2050.  This #1 Strong climate treaties are ambitious, compliant and 
encompass almost all of the globes’ nations.  
Population, growth and climate change 
Economic growth is moderately high worldwide, though somewhat lessened by the 
costs of high mitigation ambitions, maintenance and repairs, investments in 
resilient infrastructure, renewables and abatement technologies and a fast 
restructuring of the economy.  
 
Renewables gradually crowd out fossil energy, which leads to growth becoming 
increasingly decoupled from fossil fuels. Along with growth, employment and 
welfare improve and the world population gradually becomes healthier and more 
educated. This causes the population growth rate to decline over time.  
 
Climate change has a dampening effect on economic growth, because of damaging 
weather events and the costs of infrastructure maintenance and migration. Even if 
there are severe conflicts in parts of the world around the strictness of 
environmental regulations and who should bear the costs, the awareness and 
acceptance among people of the severe negative impacts of climate change 
strengthen green norms and preferences in the population. This leads to higher 
political mitigation ambitions and international commitments are gradually 
strengthened. The world seems to be on a pathway where warming will be limited 
to less than 2 ̊ C and the most dangerous effects of climate change avoided. 
However, frequent extreme events and non-linear climate change processes still 
wreak havoc from time to time.  
International cooperation and geopolitics 
The ambitious global climate treaty becomes a reality: After the first COP 
stocktake in 2023 decided in the Paris Agreement, new and stronger pledges 
(NDCs) are taken on by virtually all the countries. The ambitions are made much 
easier and attractive by the rapidly growing access to cheap clean technologies. 
Carbon pricing and other regulatory measures are gradually introduced in most 
countries, though not equally strict in all sectors and regions.  
 
The EU strengthens the emissions control by several decisions: The reserve of 
allowances in the Emissions Trading System (ETS), which has been held back 
during 2020s, is deleted. The ETS cap is reduced markedly from 2031 to 2040, and 
then further restrained from 2041 to 2050. Negative emissions are included in the 
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ETS. Further, the EU launches a moratorium on new fossil fuel power, unless 
abated with CCS. Emissions standards and road pricing are extensively used in the 
transport sector, and under the EU’s leadership, international air and shipping 
become regulated by comprehensive international agreements. The ambitious EU 
policies are supported by an accepting and trustful population. 
 
Regulation of Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions are gradually strengthened in 
most countries across the world. Also, marginal abatement costs converge, partly 
facilitated by extending ETS markets and linking of markets across borders. 
International efforts are made to ensure the development and transfer of renewable 
technologies. By the end of the period, both sinks and sources are linked in a global 
trading system, and loss-and-damage-mechanisms4 are in place and working, 
making adaptation more feasible for the most affected regions. 
Technology development 
Rapid growth in clean technology is a main prerequisite for the successful 
mitigation and cooperation efforts. Along with cost decreases for the low-emission 
technologies we know today due to learning-curves, there is a willingness to fund 
the introduction and testing of novel solutions. One novel area of R&D and large-
scale testing is that of negative emission technologies. R&D support to dirty 
technologies is weakened or totally phased out. Smart grids with decentralized 
production and prosumers become a prevalent feature of the energy systems. The 
need for heating and cooling in buildings and industry is to large extent delivered 
by heat-pumps that run on new renewable powers and replace fossils.  
 
In the first part of the period, the technological change relies on green incentive 
structures in many countries for clean technology R&D and diffusion. Besides 
support schemes, the development is a response to high demand for low-emission 
technologies. Also among consumers, final goods and services with low- 
carbon/GHG footprints are preferred. These shifts in demand result both from high 
carbon prices and the significant transition of preferences and norms. General 
productivity gains increase leisure (as opposed to consumption) more than has 
historically been the case. 
Energy mix 
In CLEAN! we see unprecedented investments in renewable energy technologies, 
batteries and other storage solutions. But despite the rapid growth in renewables, 
however, transition still takes time because phasing-out of existing coal plants is 
slow in some areas.  
4.2.3. DARK!  
In this future, neither #6 Lower oil demand nor #8 Green norms and preferences 
occur. On the contrary, there are plenty of cheap fossil energy resources and high 
reliance on old energy technologies and mindsets. As a consequence, no #1 Strong 
climate treaties are pushed and the Paris Agreement turns out to be a failure with 
no abatement impact. By the first stocktaking in 2023 it becomes clear that few 
nations reinforce their targets. USA has completely withdrawn and several 
countries follow the US’ abandoning. The EU and a few wealthy, small countries 
keep mitigation ambitions high and try to rescue the Paris Agreement, however, in 
the second decade no coordinated efforts are made to mitigate climate change.  
 
Alongside the abundance of cheap fossil fuels, investments in renewable 
technologies are too slow and, subsequently, abatement costs are higher than 
expected. Security of supply is perceived by many policymakers as more important 
                                                     
4 Loss-and-damage-mechanisms are designed to address, fund and compensate loss and damage 
associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change.  
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than accelerating the shift from fossils to what they perceive to be intermittent and 
unreliable renewables. These facts hamper the transformation to green attitudes and 
lifestyles and the progress of international climate negotiations.  
 
Worse, in the DARK! scenario there is an escalating conflict between China and 
the US over economic, political and military power. Other parts of the world, 
including EU is drawn in. It starts in the wake of the fruitless negotiations on 
climate change, and as the years go by, the large economic burdens of frequent 
natural disasters, social unrest and pessimism reinforce the tensions. A regional 
pacific war breaks out (non-nuclear) and lasts well into the 2040s and the last years 
of the decade are devoted to a rebuilding of the societies.  
Population, growth and climate change 
During the first decade, economic growth is relatively high, inter alia, due to large 
supply of cheap fossil energy. Population grows at a moderate rate. Signs of 
climate change are not obvious and climate change has low priority. Only the EU 
and a few wealthy, small countries keep mitigation ambitions high and try to rescue 
the Paris Agreement.  
 
As the years go by, hurricanes, floods, heatwaves and drought incidents become 
ever more frequent. In USA, there is increasing unrest and dissatisfaction with the 
government; the US. government blames China for the steadily more apparent 
changes of the global climate. Chinese money pulls out of Europe and USA as a 
response and this severely reinforces the economic recession.  
 
When military clashes break out from around 2030, also the EU gives up its long-
term climate policy ambitions. Between 2040 and 2050, all the nations that have 
been involved in the global conflict need full focus on rebuilding of their 
economies. In addition, there are frequent natural disasters in all parts of the world. 
EU resumes climate policy efforts towards the very end of the period. 
International cooperation and geopolitics 
The Paris climate agreement starts falling apart already during the 2020’s, and only 
the EU and a few wealthy, small countries keep mitigation ambitions high in an 
attempt to rescue the agreement. They only succeed to continue a shallow and 
limited international cooperation in climate policies, and only for the first decade.  
Technology development 
During the 2020s there are moderate levels of R&D activity, but no further 
significant breakthroughs occur in batteries or low-carbon technologies other than 
for military applications. There is also less focus on R&D in large-scale 
renewables, as the prospects for being able to compete with the cheap fossil fuel 
supply appear small. Along with increasing global tensions, the large economies 
redirect all R&D resources to military research and all progress within mitigation 
technologies halts. 
 
The reliance on and development of the digital economy with smart-grid and 
internet of things, is fragmented due to the risk for hostile hacking and digital 
terror. The development of smart cities, electrification and energy infrastructure is 
also of less relevance in this scenario, and viewed as a potential vulnerability. The 
political emphasis is on national security and near-term interests. 
Energy mix 
Russia continues to be a stable gas supplier. During the 2020s there is a slow 
increase in the share of renewables, and some switching from coal to gas, however,  
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fossil fuels continue to be dominant. Due to the uncertain geopolitical situation 
(military clashes and war), there are virtually no resources devoted to renewable 
energy infrastructures. Military R&D leads to lower costs of nuclear technologies 
and a resulting higher reliance on nuclear power plants. However, shortage of 
nuclear fuel after the wars increases the share of fossil fuels again.  
4.2.4. RICH!  
The RICH! future is characterised by massive investment growth in renewables, 
causing a drop to much #6 Lower oil demand. The success of renewable 
technologies is not the result of #8 Green norms and preferences or #1 Strong 
climate treaties, but a sudden realisation that renewables have become 
economically competitive and commercially very attractive. Technological 
breakthroughs and rapid innovations make renewables so cheap that fossil fuel 
resources struggle to compete purely on price. The technological transition starts in 
the China and EU, as this is where the green investment and R&D takes off first. 
This renewable revolution inhibits the most overwhelming threats of climate 
change, but further global climate negotiations struggle with increasing social 
inequality and discussions over allocation of burdens. This weakens the 
compliance and ambitions of climate treaties. 
Population, growth and climate change 
EU growth is based on affordable (renewable) energy and on the economy being a 
global market leader on innovative energy technologies. Cities are key political 
agents. Even if rapid technological progress and robotization drive growth, labour 
resources are highly educated and effectively exploited, particularly within R&D 
and services.  People still work as much as today for instance with R&D and a lot 
of new service activities. Along with the economic growth, inequality increases. 
The European population is growing.  
 
The renewable industries grow so quickly in all countries that clean technologies 
increasingly replace fossil fuel use and thus limit the emissions. The greening of 
norms and environmental consciousness is not pronounced, however, and we see 
continued, growing damages to nature and loss of species in vast areas in the wake 
of renewable energy generation. And due to the lack of ambitious and compliant 
climate treaties, global abatement of GHGs is slower than required for keeping 
below 2 ̊ C. Climate change materialises along this scenario as moderately 
frequent, and slowly escalating, incidents of drought, hurricanes, floods etc. 
However, within the period until 2050 they do not get as severe as to draw the 
nations into another large-scale, ambitious effort of global climate negotiations. 
International cooperation and geopolitics 
The globalization trend continues. The global community collaborates on trade 
liberalisation, technological transfer and national and international institutional 
development. A fine-tuned weapon balance between strong, equal military 
alliances is crucial for world peace. Military spending is particularly sizeable by 
the large nations. The US continues its tradition of the protective role for the 
European countries. Trump is not re-elected; the US foreign affairs and trade 
policy in the 2020s fall back on the track from the Obama era. Despite Brexit, 
Britain is still closely linked to the EU economically and politically.  
 
The world becomes culturally more homogenous and thus travelling from city to 
city gets more routine and less exotic. Business collaboration rather exploits digital 
virtual-reality solutions. Air travelling is still growing, but not as rapidly as in the 
2010’s.  
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Technology development 
EU’s position as a clean technology forerunner is gained not least due to the heavy 
subsidy programmes in the years before and well into the 2020s within renewables, 
electrified transport and emission-free industry processes. Wind and solar energy, 
together with energy storage, becomes rapidly cheaper. Circular economy makes 
effective use of raw materials. Nuclear power becomes more secure and efficient 
and is revitalised, but struggle with competitiveness relative to renewables. 
Battery-electric and zero-emission hydrogen dominate all new transport completely 
from the 2040s. Robots and digital solutions are emerging within all fields. 
Hydrogen reduction is widely used in manufacturing, increasingly replacing coal in 
the industry sector. 
Energy mix 
By 2030, EU renewable generation acquires a higher share than the target (i.e., 
27% of final energy consumption). Nuclear is competitive and upholds its share 
both in the EU and globally. In the second decade, the share of nuclear starts 
increasing. Coal power is completely out of the European energy mix, and is also 
declining in the rest of the world. Energy storage problems are mostly solved, 
including hydrogen production and an extensive grid distributing the energy 
according to demand. Energy production is a smart mix of both centralised and 
decentralised. The energy supply in the 2040’s is fully based on power from 
renewables and nuclear. Electricity demand is high. 
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5. From qualitative to quantitative scenarios 
The ambition of the subsequent work of SMART PATHS is to provide two distinct 
contributions based on the scenarios. First, the four explorative, qualitative 
scenarios above will serve as the starting point for quantitative global scenarios. 
The main research question to be studied by this approach is: What likely future 
external impulses are particularly decisive for the performance of national climate 
strategies? Obviously, the quantifications will have to be less detailed and 
colourful than the sketches of the scenarios resulting from the qualitative exercise. 
The main drivers in each global scenario will be translated into relevant parameters 
and exogenous variables and quantified within two different global models. The 
first, ETSAP-TIAM, is an energy system model, which has its strength in capturing 
energy technological aspects of the scenarios. The other model, SNOW, is a 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) model which is more focussed on how 
regional economic resources, trade relations and factor movements among 
countries affect the economies involved. The two model traditions will be iterated 
to complement each other in the quantitative descriptions of the scenarios. 
 
Second, we concentrate on particularly decisive factors for the Norwegian climate 
strategies because the global scenarios eventually will be used to answer the 
following research question: How robust are Norwegian climate strategies to 
external impulses? The approach to answer this question will be simulations of a 
Norwegian CGE model – SNOW-NO – which can be linked to the global SNOW 
model. The response of the Norwegian economy and policymakers to changes in 
external drivers is an important robustness check of the domestic climate strategies. 
 
Similar scenario studies play an important role in research on global climate 
change. There is a large literature on global scenarios, to which the contributions of 
SMART PATHS will contribute. One branch of this literature consists of energy 
system analysis, among which the annual Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP), 
led by IEA has a particularly strong impact. In IEA (2017) three scenarios towards 
2060 are developed: The Reference Technology Scenario assuming existing 
international commitments are met, the Two Degree Scenario, assumed to keep 
long-run global warming below 2°C, and the Beyond Two Degree Scenario which 
tests how far the world can get with large-scale exploitation by 2060 of all 
technologies either available or in the pipeline today. The report assesses their 
challenges in terms of climate goals, economic development and energy security.  
 
As the analysis is partial, the scenarios rely on exogenous input on the economic 
development from IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database5 and the economic 
development is assumed identical for the three scenarios. In comparison, SMART 
PATHS aims to scrutinise the dependence between the technological and economic 
development. The interdependences are in both directions: Technological 
breakthroughs and dispersion change the economic performance and comparative 
advantage of regions and economic activities like trade, R&D, investments and use 
of capital are determinants of technological change. Economic policies in general, 
and abatement policies in particular, affect both economic performance and 
technological change.   
 
Another large and dominant scenario project our analysis will relate to is the so-
called Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSP) project (O’Neill et al., 2017), 
developed by a large international research collaboration. The purpose is to 
establish a common set of benchmarks for studies of policy options for the globe. 
The SSPs include five consistent narratives for the world and is quantified by 
                                                     
5 https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/01/weodata/index.aspx 
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means of six large models, including energy system models and CGE/IAM6 
models. The approach of SMART PATHS is closely related. It includes and aims to 
quantify four narratives (and a business-as-usual scenario can also become topical). 
We will use two complementary models in tandem to quantify them. 
 
An important distinction between the projects is that the SSPs pre-define the results 
of the scenarios and go backwards by asking whether there is a reasonable 
combination of drivers that can produce these results. This is called back-casting 
within the foresight methodologies. Specifically, the results that the SSPs target are 
distinct scenarios in terms of what challenges they will face in terms of mitigation 
and/or adaptation policies. On the contrary, the scenarios of SMART PATHS start 
with the causes and derive the outcomes. The causes, or driving forces, are 
systematically picked and assessed before they are combined in coherent 
narratives.  
 
SMART PATHS has several ambitions that fit in with those of the SSP project. 
First, it also aims to study policy options, however, by taking a national 
perspective rather than the global perspective of the SSPs. According to the 
decided outline of the forthcoming 6th assessment report of the IPCC, national 
perspectives and national policy choices are anticipated to be emphasised in the 
report (IPCC, 2017). In that respect, SMART PATHS can hopefully fit into the 
background literature of the assessment. The plan is to treat the global scenarios as 
alternative exogenous surroundings in which the Norwegian climate policy strategy 
is to be designed. To prepare the global scenarios for a robustness study for the 
small, open Norwegian economy, part of SMART PATHS’ task is to link the 
outcomes of the socioeconomic drivers to plausible global policy actions. 
Abatement policies (and adaptation policies) are explicitly left out of the SSPs, 
because they are benchmarks for global policies. In this respect, our global 
scenarios add to the ambition of the SSPs.  
 
Furthermore, most published quantitative scenarios are long-term projections that 
lack medium-term descriptions. Also, few scenarios take into consideration 
imperfect and diverse policy choices and unfavourable collaboration environments. 
SMART PATHS aims to fill these gaps. Van Ruijven (2016) points to a serious 
knowledge gap of quantitative medium-term implications when real-world 
restrictions are accounted for. In this respect, we find two of the four scenarios 
particularly interesting. First, the DARK! scenario describes a world where cheap 
fossil fuel resources and reliance on old technologies and mindsets slowly 
deteriorate international collaboration on climate change, and where the economic 
implications over the long term are destructive and reinforce national and 
international inequality. The other is SPLIT!, where the developed world assumes a 
proactive role in mitigating climate change, while large abundance of fossil fuels 
combined with inertia and lobbyism hamper the actions of the less developed and 
emerging countries. The world thus simultaneously follows two opposing tracks on 
energy and climate, causing an inherent conflict and evolving divergence.  
 
As a small, open economy, decisions by Norwegian agents in general, and the cost, 
design and performance of alternative national climate strategies, in particular, will 
expectedly not affect the world’s climate and energy situation in any significant 
ways. If anything, it can influence early stages of learning curves and R&D for new 
innovations, by being an early adopter with capacity for government stimulus in 
periods when commercial risks are high.  
 
                                                     
6 Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) are extensions of CGE models by including impacts of 
climate change on the economies.  
  
Significant and plausible futures Reports 2018/2     
34 Statistics Norway 
On the other hand, Norway relies heavily on the global surroundings. Also, despite 
that the goal of becoming a low-emission society by 2050 has been established as 
Norwegian law (Stortinget, 2017), external factors will affect exactly what this 
society will look like. The scenario work in SMART PATHS aims at shedding light 
on these futures, and the ‘smartest’ way to get there.  
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Vedlegg A: SMART PATHS project description 
Smart paths and costly detours towards a sustainable 
low-emission society            short: “SMART PATHS” 
A.1 Relevance relative to the call for proposals 
KLIMAFORSK works to build up knowledge that can be used to achieve a low-
emission society by 2050. The overarching objective of this proposal is to craft 
medium-term national climate strategies that will take us on a smart path to 
the low-emission society. We see ‘climate strategies’ as the combined choices of 
national emission targets, climate policy instruments and monitoring procedures 
underway to watch the transformation path. ‘Smart’ refers to climate strategies that 
are ‘persistent’, ‘cost-effective’ and ‘robust’.  By ‘persistent’ we mean that 
emission abatement along the path should involve measures with longer-term 
transformation potential. We hypothesise that picking only low-hanging fruits in 
the nearer term would easily lead the society on a costly detour to the low-emission 
society, because sluggish investments and other behavioural responses can imply 
fossil-fuel lock-in. The ‘cost-effectiveness’ criterion will call for well-targeted 
policies to transcend the lock-in challenge – policies that most likely will divert 
from the usual economic recommendation of uniform emission pricing. Finally, a 
‘robust’ path is characterised by being smart even if external circumstances are 
changing.  
 
The call is particularly concerned with how domestic mitigation is affected by 
societal drivers, many of which are partly out of the control of national policies. In 
our first Work-package (WP1), we ask the following main research question RQ1: 
What likely future external impulses are particularly decisive for the performance 
of national climate strategies? We will analyse technological, demographical and 
international economic and political drivers, with particular attention to the 
consequences of EU’s climate and energy policy, which is especially mentioned in 
the call. In a separate task, we will also address how trends in norms and attitudes 
can affect the society’s response to climate policies. 
 
The main exploration of smart paths and detours will take place in WP2. We 
decompose the study of choices of national emission targets and climate policy 
instruments into three tasks: Task 2a addresses the ‘persistence’ criterion by posing 
RQ2a: Are medium-term targets smart or costly devices to achieve persistent 
emission cuts? Task 2b follows up the ‘cost-effectiveness’ issue by asking RQ2b: 
How to design cost-effective climate policies that avoid lock-in? In Task 2c the 
focus is on ‘robustness’ with respect to the impulses mapped in WP1: RQ2c: How 
robust are Norwegian climate strategies to external impulses? Finally, in WP3 we 
hypothesise that monitoring the pathway should be part of a climate strategy: RQ3: 
What transformation indicators should be used for monitoring and facilitating 
adjustments on the way towards the low-emission society?  
 
KLIMAFORSK calls for development of new tools, specified by, e.g., models. 
Besides novel theoretical modelling, explorative scenario analysis and literature 
reviews, we will in our research rely heavily on innovative numerical modelling of 
Norwegian low-emission pathways. We expect our main methodological 
contributions in this respect to be the modelling of  
(I) a rich mixture of response dynamics to domestic climate strategies and 
external shifts, including: technological deployment, changed industry and 
consumption patterns, and behavioural adaptation to norms and attitudes. 
The latter involves social and psychological dimensions of behaviour so far 
almost unexamined in the context of large-scale, macro-economic models,  
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(II) the intertemporal dynamics of sluggishness and lock-in between the low-
emission steady state and the transitional climate strategy pathway, and 
(III) consistent sets of assumptions about uncertain external drivers of 
particular significance to the Norwegian climate strategies, with the aim to 
investigate the strategies’ robustness to external changes.  
As pointed out in the call, there is a need for studying impact of public policies’ on 
various time horizons, in relation to various objectives and in all sectors; our 
dynamic, large-scale model approach will respond to all these requests. Sectors of 
particular interest for the call are industry, transport and agriculture; all central in 
our proposal. An example of a detour within the transport sector could be to 
massively phase in first-generation biofuels that crowds out resources and demand 
for public transportation infrastructure. In energy-intensive manufacturing a detour 
could be to seize the immediate, low-cost option of relocating businesses, even if 
staying close to the clean energy supply in Norway could well render competitive 
in a global low-emission future.  
 
It is clear from our ambitions that interdisciplinary research is necessary; 
economists, behavioural psychologists and technologists will collaborate closely in 
all WPs. In addition to our communication and dissemination activities with users, 
user involvement will be actively pursued by linking to the project a 
Transdisciplinary Science-Policy Forum with a variety of backgrounds from the 
business, government and research sector. The team includes 60% women, 
including the project manager, and female applicants for our recruit positions will 
be encouraged. One task (2b) is headed by a young economist.  
A.2 Aspects relating to the project 
A.2.1 Background and status of knowledge 
The Norwegian Government has endorsed the target of becoming a low-emission 
society by 2050. The indicated interpretation is an 80 per cent cut or more in 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from the 1990 emissions (MDIR, 2014). In the 
medium term, Norway commits to an at least 40 percent reduction by 2030 in the 
Paris agreement. The Norwegian strategy is to link the policy to the climate and 
energy policy of the EU and get access to flexible mechanisms (Meld. St. 13 
(2014-2015)). Moreover, in a recent announcement the Parliament decided climate 
emissions neutrality by 2030, meaning that remaining domestic emissions will be 
neutralised by, e.g., carbon offsets. Our proposed analysis will take all these 
commitments as premises. Even so, there exist many seemingly viable routes to the 
low-emission society.  
Expected novel findings compared to the status of knowledge  
All the findings from the five RQs presented above will contribute to the 
knowledge about transitional routes a nation can take. The Norwegian low-
emission transformation will be our example, but many of its challenges will be 
recognisable by other small, developed and climate-ambitious countries.  
 
The main exploration of smart paths and detours will take place in WP2. RQ2a in 
WP2 questions the ‘persistence’ of attained medium-term abatement, because the 
medium-term focus easily diverts attention and resources away from the long-run, 
low-emission target. However, against this hypothesis stands the argument that 
medium-term targets ensure monitoring and commitment on the way. The 
intertemporal dynamics of markets and politicians can inherently cause long-term 
ambitions to be lowered as the date of implementation approaches (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977; Karp and Tsur, 2011). When authorities are unable to credibly and 
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convincingly commit to the future low-emission target, one suggested device is to 
set binding medium-term targets (Ismer and Neuhoff, 2009).  
 
Our reason for revisiting the role of medium-term targets is that their myopic bias 
can bring about costly detours without radical technological or behavioural 
transformation: When investment costs are sunk and activity locked in for a long 
time, further transformation towards the low-emission society can be seriously 
hampered (Arthur, 1989; Narain and van’t Veld, 2008). Lock-in problems in 
transition were early recognised. The most obvious is that investments in 
infrastructure and other capital take long time to carry out and are long-lived. The 
putty-clay model of investments was introduced already in Johansen (1959). 
Transitional costs may also occur as a consequence of bounded rationality 
phenomena, such as habits (Kallbekken and Sælen, 2013), myopia (Gabaix, 2016) 
and hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997). Moreover, behavioural responses can 
be hampered by social motivations and group dynamics (Schultz et al., 2007). 
Pointing out this principal trade-off between commitment and transformation might 
not be new. However, van Ruijven (2016) points to a serious gap of quantitative 
knowledge about medium-term implications when real-world restrictions are 
accounted for. Our project will contribute to fill this gap. In particular, we will 
model numerically realistic mechanisms that explain sluggish investment as well as 
consumer behavioural responses.  
 
RQ2b calls for conclusions about ‘cost-effective’ policies in presence of sluggish 
responses. It should be emphasised that the policy implication is not that action 
should be deferred. Our hypothesis rather implies the contrary: The risk of lock-in 
needs to be met by immediate well-targeted policy instruments. Depending on the 
particular mechanism at play, investment and consumer behaviour can be 
incentivised by well-framed, tailored information (Hurlstone,et al., 2014; Jessou 
and Rapson, 2015), default rules/nudging (Kallbekken and Sælen, 2013), network-
building (Currarini et al., 2014; Greaker and Midttømme, 2016).  
 
RQ2c on ‘robustness’ will be addressed by systematically exposing the suggested 
climate strategies to alternative external scenarios. That is, first the RQ1 from WP1 
needs to be answered: What likely future external impulses are particularly 
decisive? There exist numerous decarbonisation scenario studies providing a 
variety of world futures, some recent and influential being IPCC (2014), EIA 
(2016), IEA (2016). They span out outcomes from serious climate change on the 
one hand and optimistic mitigation scenarios that achieve the 1.5 °C target on the 
other (as in recent Rogelj et al., 2015 and Aldy et al., 2016). Making use of existing 
global pathways in a country study is not straightforward, as crucial drivers and 
smart response strategies are highly country-specific (Sachs et al., 2014). This calls 
for constructing well-selected scenarios for our specific case that centre around the 
most relevant factors for the Norwegian low-emission pathways. In that exercise 
we will also account for alternative future trends in norms and attitudes. The results 
from this exercise in WP1 can then be exploited to bring about findings on whether 
climate strategies are ‘robust’ to consistent changes in the surroundings. A few 
examples can illustrate the relevance of such analysis: Extreme weather events can 
affect attitudes and bring about new behavioural patterns. Immigration will affect 
levels of consumption and production and tend to accentuate the need for 
technological solutions. On the other hand, a strategy heavily based on 
technological transformation will inevitably become more onerous the slower the 
global technological progress turns out to be. 
 
Finally, the main finding expected from RQ3 is a new set of indicators intended for 
monitoring the transformation and facilitating adjustments towards the low-
emission society. From the discussion above it is clear that measuring how 
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emission targets are met along a transformation path can be insufficient; a wider set 
of transformation indicators would more precisely guide policy-makers and 
stakeholders to the smart path. Our point of departure will be existing sustainability 
indicators in a wider sense; see Arrow et al. (2012); World Bank (2006); UN 
(2016). Our challenge departs from global climate change indicator initiatives like 
UNECE (2016) by focussing on single nations’ performance, while at the same 
time acknowledging that climate change is a global phenomenon. This will call for 
a complementary set of emission metrics that embraces territorial as well as global 
effects; see, e.g., Greaker et al. (2013). In addition, technological, behavioural and 
political/institutional transformation that is not immediately visible as emission 
cuts must be captured. The robustness of the transformation strategies of the 
government and other actors to external changes is another important aspect. 
Expected methodological contributions 
We will employ advanced numerical model tools in order to generate the findings 
above. The research will rely on several novel methodological features, where the 
most important are expected to be:  
  
(I) A rich mixture of response dynamics that interplay simultaneously will be 
represented in the models. As a result of the work in WP1 and WP2 we will be able 
to combine three qualitatively different response mechanisms:  
(a) Technological investments and deployment 
(b) Reallocation of production and consumption in response to price and 
income changes 
(c) Behavioural responses to changes in social norms, preferences and habits   
In the present scenario literature, type (a)-responses tend to be studied in 
technology-based, energy-system (bottom-up) models; see, e.g., EIA (2003), 
Loulou and Labriet (2008), IEA (2016) and IIASA (2016), while type (b)-
responses are built into macro-economic (top-down) CGE models (Böhringer, 
Rutherford, Tol, 2009; Dixit and Jorgenson, 2013). Bottom-up models typically do 
not provide a microeconomic framework and neglect interactions between the 
energy system and the rest of the economy. On the other hand, top-down models 
lack detailed technology information. However, by combining the approaches into 
a hybrid modelling framework it is possible to embrace both technological and 
reallocative responses to policy and external conditions. Hybrids of the two types 
have emerged (e.g., The Energy Journal, 2006, Böhringer and Rutherford, 2008; 
Fæhn and Isaksen, 2016). However, in dynamic settings they are extremely rare. 
Van Ruijven (2016) has surveyed the extensive literature on pathways to a global 
low-emission future and concludes that a serious gap is the lack of models 
accounting for both types of responses. The CGE models of Statistics Norway 
(SSB) are hybrids with (a) and (b)-responses (Fæhn and Isaksen, 2016; Bye et al., 
2015). We will develop the hybrid features of these models further; see Task 2a.  
 
Most notably, we will supplement the (a) and (b)-type responses in SSB’s models 
with (c)-type responses in order to capture more realistic behavioural responses. 
Whether bottom-up, top-down or hybrid, models typically assume economic agents 
with fully-informed, rational utilitarian behaviour and cost-effective solutions. 
Recent multidisciplinary experimental research provides evidence of bounded 
rationality with impact on macroeconomics in several ways (e.g., Akerlof, 2002; 
Shafir, 2013, Sunstein, 2015). In order to persistently and effectively transform 
behaviour these features must be accounted for in a climate strategy. Based on 
review of the vast theoretical and empirical/experimental literature we will pick a 
few among the most relevant and quantifiable phenomena to be included into our 
numerical model framework; see Task 1a and 2b. 
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(II) the intertemporal dynamics of sluggishness and lock-in between the low-
emission steady state and the transitional climate strategy pathway will be 
modelled. This is a prerequisite for properly addressing the RQs in WP2. 
Nevertheless, most numerical models and existing scenarios implicitly assume that 
capital can be smoothly and instantaneously employed where desired and that 
consumer behaviour is rational. We will model technological inertia by the so-
called ‘putty clay’ model (Johansen, 1959; Lau, Pahlke and Rutherford, 2002), and 
a particular challenge in our project will be to model abatement technology inertia. 
Behavioural inertia is virtually not explored in a numerical framework, and we will 
build on the behavioural modelling in WP1. 
(III) Consistent sets of assumptions about uncertain external drivers will be 
developed in WP1.Our approach will deviate from and add to the scope of 
commonly used sensitivity test devices (Arndt, 1996) and more selective 
robustness tests (as in Greaker and Rosnes, 2015) by picking a few consistent sets 
of assumptions to form distinct storylines, into which we will systematically 
introduce the climate strategies. Our main tools for global projections will be the 
global bottom-up model ETSAP-TIAM (TIMES Integrated Assessment Model; see 
Loulou and Labriet, 2008; Loulou, 2008) along with SNoW (Statistics Norway’s 
world CGE model; see Böhringer et al., 2015; Böhringer et al., 2012). A particular 
quality of the SNoW model is that it can be consistently linked to the CGE model 
for Norway that we will use for the robustness analysis of climate strategies, 
SNoW-No (Greaker and Rosnes, 2015; Bye et al., 2015). 
A.2.2 Approaches, hypotheses and choice of method  
The project consists of three closely interlinked WPs: 
WP1: External surroundings for choice of national climate strategies  
Head: Arne Lind, Institute for Energy Technology, IFE.  
WP1poses the main RQ1: What likely future external impulses are particularly 
decisive for the performance of national climate strategies? It will identify what 
are the crucial external factors that the Norwegian climate strategies will have to 
relate to and assess their likely developments. External in this context does not 
mean that they are completely beyond control or independent of Norwegian 
decisions, but that they are exogenous to the domestic agents and mechanisms we 
model. Task 1a will consider how social norms and attitudes might develop and 
their potential effects on consumer behaviour, while Task 1b will map global 
technological progress, demographical changes and international, particularly 
European, economic and political drivers.  
 
Task 1a: The role of social norms and attitudes for behavioural response – headed 
by Per Espen Stoknes, BI. We will explore how alternative choices of behavioural 
models matter for the conclusions on consumption patterns and energy use along 
the transition path, where transport choices is a key issue. The ambition is to 
generate a partial equilibrium, analytical framework, which will be operationalised 
and developed further in WP2. Many observed and studied behavioural phenomena 
that question the traditional rational agent models are found to be relevant to 
climate behaviour and low-emission transformation (Hurlstone, 2014; Sunstein, 
2015). Based on the most recent literature we will select behavioural models based 
on their relevance and significance to Norwegian climate strategies, compatibility 
with our framework and data availability. Our current reading is that these three are 
among the candidates: A) myopia, where we can exploit models retrieved from 
monetary and fiscal market behaviour (Gabaix, 2016), B) habits, which have 
analogies with other models of transitional costs (Abel and Eberly, 1994) and C) 
network externalities that imply lock-in (Currarini et al., 2014).  
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Task 1b: Technological, economic and demographic drivers – headed by Arne 
Lind, IFE. The purpose of this task is to define and simulate a limited set of distinct 
scenarios where we vary the developments of external factors to form consistent 
storylines. Most importantly, we will put effort into selecting the main, relevant 
external driving forces for the performance of Norwegian climate strategies. We 
will base our selection on a literature survey of existing global scenarios combined 
with explorative scenario experiments (Schwartz, 1999, Stoknes and Hermansen, 
2004; van der Heijden, 2005). The exercise is intended to provide us with a set of 
conceptual storylines that are distinguished in interesting and policy-relevant ways 
for the Norwegian low-emission future.  Particularly important to explore are 
alternative outcomes of the ongoing negotiations, involving Norway, on EU’s 
effort-sharing and flexibility arrangements, as well as outcomes of actions in the 
wake of Paris. These processes will be pivotal for Norway not least through their 
impacts on the global technological progress and cost development and on demand, 
competitiveness and input prices in international markets. Growth in population, 
workforce and migration are other influential factors for the low-emission 
transition.  
 
We will use two global models in team to construct consistent developments based 
on these storylines. The first is the ETSAP-TIAM, which IFE uses for global and 
multinational analysis (e.g., García-Gusano et al., 2016). It is a technology-rich, 
partial-equilibrium, bottom-up model with a detailed description of different 
energy forms, resources, processing technologies and end-uses. Also fossil fuel 
extraction, trade and prices are determined endogenously, a special advantage of 
the ETSAP-TIAM model, as these markets are particularly significant for the 
Norwegian future pathways. In addition, mechanisms for endogenous learning by 
doing are accounted for, which will provide us with important information on how 
international prices of technologies evolve in various global settings.  
 
Projections for the rest of the economy are taken as exogenous in ETSAP-TIAM. 
However, TIMES models are predesigned to be easily linked up to various types of 
scenarios. Besides being compatible with explorative scenarios of the types 
described above, ETSAP-TIAM is suited for joint simulations and iterations with 
global CGE models. This implies we can use it in team with the SNoW model, an 
MPSGE-programmed CGE model based on the GTAP database (Rutherford, 1999; 
Narayanan et al., 2012) that is particularly designed for projecting the global 
market situations under different climate assumptions. Norway can be treated as a 
separate region in SNoW (Böhringer et al., 2015), thereby linking our model of 
Norway, SNoW-No, to Europe and the rest of the world. We will build on already 
established procedures for modelling the links between the European climate and 
energy policies and Norwegian climate strategies in Aune and Fæhn (2016). The 
joint simulations will provide us with a set of distinct reference settings for the 
study of Norwegian climate strategies in WP2. More details on present SNoW-No 
and further development plans is provided in the description of WP2 below.   
WP2: Climate targets and policies that lead us on a smart path and avoid 
detours  
Head: Taran Fæhn, SSB 
 
WP2 responds to the overarching objective of our proposal, which is to craft 
medium-term national climate strategies that will take us on a smart path to the 
low-emission society. It is addressed by exploring the RQs in the three tasks below.  
 
Task 2a: Are medium-term targets smart or costly devices to achieve persistent 
emission cuts? – headed by Taran Fæhn, SSB. We will study whether targeting 
medium-term (2030) emission goals in the most cost-effective manner will lead us 
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on the smartest long-term pathway, defined as attaining and sustaining the low-
emission society from 2050 onwards at the lowest possible social cost. If the 
abatement by 2030 relies on technologies and behaviour that lock the society in 
fossil fuel-based patterns for the next decades, the low-emission society will be 
unnecessarily costly. In this analysis, we will take the Norwegian 2030 and 2050 
commitments as given, but allow for utilising more or less of the various flexibility 
mechanisms intended in the EU proposal and the Paris Agreement up to 2030. The 
lock-in costs can be explored by comparing scenarios where domestic emissions 
are exogenous (mid-term targets) and endogenous (only long-term, low-emission 
target).  
 
Our main work horse for studying the dynamic climate strategies both in task 2a, 
2b and 2c will be the recently developed hybrid CGE model SNoW-No, which can 
be simulated as a dynamic Ramsey-type model (See, e.g., Bye and Nyborg, 2003; 
Lau et al., 2012). SNoW-No is the most recent of the hybrid model versions 
developed in SSB. It will give a detailed and technology-rich description of the 
Norwegian economy and low-emission pathways. We need to develop SNoW-No 
in order to be able to address the lock-in issues, the behavioural model alternatives 
that will be part of the transformation pathways, cost-effective policy options as 
well as the robustness of climate strategies. Compared with previous model 
versions, we will: 
• Update technological input relevant for 2030 and 2050; currently, old 
information from Klimakur 2020 (2010) is the main basis for future costs and 
abatement potentials. Besides, we will increase the scope for sectoral responses 
to climate policy by including abatement information for a larger set of sectors 
(e.g., public infrastructure and LULUCF). We will survey the extensive 
literature, including global bottom-up scenario studies. A particularly valuable 
source will be the database developed by the Norwegian Environment Agency, 
MDIR (MDIR, 2014). Key experts at MDIR will work closely with the project 
team and are also represented in the Transdisciplinary Forum. Furthermore, 
IFE’s model TIMES Norway (Rosenberg et al., 2013) has built in knowledge 
on end-user energy technologies. Our team already has experience with 
combining knowledge of TIMES Norway with that of SNoW-No (Bye et al., 
2016).  
• Model alternative preferential structures that account for realistic social and 
psychological behavioural drivers. We will build on the experience and choices 
from Task 1a. Besides modelling the dynamic and economy-wide interplays, 
policy instruments need to be represented to address policy issues in Task 2b 
(see also methodological contribution (I) above). 
• Model putty-clay features along the lines of Lau, Pahlke, Rutherford (2002) to 
represent realistic technological transition costs of both abatement investments 
and other investments (see contribution (II) above).  
• Integrate the updated and improved SNoW-No model into the global context of 
the global SNoW model and simulate it under the different external assumption 
sets in the robustness study of tsk 2c (see contribution (III) above).  
Task 2b: How to design cost-effective climate policies that avoid lock-in? – headed 
by Halvor Storrøsten, SSB. The purpose of this task is to characterise and 
operationalise cost-effective policy instruments in the presence of lock-in and 
transition costs. We will start with analytical explorations of welfare-maximising 
social and private partial equilibria when behavioural transformation is sluggish. 
Specifically, we intend to build intertemporal analytical models that build on the 
considerations and theoretical modelling of alternative consumer behaviour in Task 
1a. The models will be used to draw conclusions about appropriate policy 
interventions, including improved information, setting defaults choice rules or 
building networks.  
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Operationalised policy instruments will then be modelled within the numerical 
setting described in Task 2a. A numerical CGE analysis will add quantitative 
information and insight into the instruments’ important interplays with other 
existing policies, with the rich variety of responses and agents and with the rest of 
the world (footprints, trade, allowance trading). We will also address policy 
implications of simultaneous technological inertia caused by putty-clay 
investments. 
Task 2c: How robust are Norwegian climate strategies to external impulses?  – 
headed by Orvika Rosnes, SSB. The set of reference paths defined in Task 1b will 
be the starting point for investigating the robustness of alternative Norwegian 
transformation pathways. We will – in accordance with our intended 
methodological contribution (III) – carry out a systematic robustness analysis of 
how the main pathways developed in Task 2a and Task 2b perform in terms of 
persistence and social costs under a predefined set of storylines (from WP1). The 
robustness analysis will also assess how flexible and adjustable the strategies are. 
Some instruments can, for instance, be too tailored or too reliant on predictability 
to be effective under shifting circumstances.  
WP3: Indicators for monitoring the transformation towards a low 
emission society  
Head: Mads Greaker, SSB  
The RQ3 on what transformation indicators should be used underway for 
monitoring and facilitating adjustments of the directions towards the low-emission 
society is motivated by the hypotheses that monitoring should be an integrated part 
of a climate strategy and that emission statistics is not a sufficient indicator of the 
status of the transformation process. Based on the analysis of emission targets in 
WP2, this WP aims to complement with a wider set of indicators. Task 3a will 
survey the existing related indicators to map their relevance for a national 
transformation indicator set. Task 3b aims at forming a conceptual framework that 
embrace the main aspects an indicator set should capture and suggest some main, 
operationalised indicator metrics. 
 
Task 3a: From sustainability indicators to national transformation indicators – 
headed by Iulie Aslaksen, SSB. 
The purpose of this task is to survey existing related indicators in order to seek 
inspiration from or directly use components that can reflect low-emission 
transformation. Among these, existing sustainability indicators are particularly 
relevant. They are designed to monitor a number of societal processes, also 
climate-relevant changes as the development of GHG emissions, energy 
availability and global warming. Their many-faceted content will also guide us to 
important trade-offs and synergies, in particular between climate change and other 
sustainability criteria. We will survey the published climate-related indicators, in 
particular. While some are oriented towards global climate-change signals like 
GHG concentration, temperature and extreme weather events, others will be more 
relevant to learn from from a national climate strategy perspective, including policy 
indicators and emission metrics. A particular criterion for a transformation 
indicator set is a forward-looking perspective; an aspect that we have already 
scrutinised in relation to sustainability indicators (Garnåsjordet et al., 2011).  
 
Task 3b: A set of national transformation indicators – headed by Mads Greaker, 
SSB. Our national focus calls for a discussion of relevant emissions concepts and 
metrics. This will build further on Greaker et al. (2013), who suggested the relevant 
measure to be the accumulated emissions relative to a nationally defined carbon 
budget. Also, the relevance and measuring of national versus global emission 
contributions (carbon leakage, carbon footprints, carbon offsets) will be discussed. 
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A particular challenge for a transformation indicator is the forward-looking 
monitoring purpose. Besides emission metrics, we will need to find indices of 
particularly three main facets of the transformation speed: (A) Technological 
transformation, which can be monitored by observing dispersion and deployment 
of climate-friendly technologies and production methods, R&D activity and impact 
within green technologies, patenting, and technology policy. Relevant to consider 
here is that energy savings need not indicate emission savings in the highly 
renewable-based Norwegian case. (B) Behavioural transformation, where 
indicators should reflect aspects like changes in attitudes, action, participation, 
consumption trends and green entrepreneurship. (C) Political, regulatory and 
institutional transformation.  Indicators here can, in principle, embrace all 
governmental decisions and operations with direct or indirect effects on the low-
emission realisation.  
We will take advantage of the analysis of the ‘persistency’, ‘cost-effectiveness’ and 
‘robustness’ criteria and consider what can be learned from the pathways analysed 
in WP2.Measuring transformation in a quantitative way is challenging, let alone 
deciding what is too little or even too much. Our numerical analyses can guide us 
to some extent. We will pay attention to methodological soundness and data 
availability when defining a functional indicator set. Transferability of knowledge 
is another concern: Even if our focus is the transformation of the Norwegian 
society, the learning from WP3 should be readily exportable. 
A.3. The project plan, project management, organisation 
and cooperation  
This project will be hosted by the Research Department in SSB. Project leader is 
Head of Research, Senior Researcher (SR) Taran Fæhn, who also heads WP2. SR 
PhD Arne Lind (IFE) heads WP1 and SR PhD Mads Greaker (SSB) WP3. Rest of 
the team will be: Dir. Per Espen Stoknes (BI), PhD Pernille Seljom (IFE), Prof. 
Karen Turner (Univ. of Strathclyde, UK), Prof. Chris Böhringer (Univ. of 
Oldenburg, Germany) and researchers from SSB (PhD Halvor Storrøsten, PhD 
Orvika Rosnes, SR PhD Iulie Aslaksen, SR PhD Brita Bye, Head of Research PhD 
Cathrine Hagem). Their allocation, which is specified in a separate attachment, is 
organised to let all WPs take advantage of several methodological approaches and 
the interdisciplinary competence in the project (economics, psychology and 
technology). The proposal aims to develop further the network built in the FME-S 
CREE, where IFE and Prof. Böhringer have been key associates. Prof. Turner is 
brought in for her particular experience in the economics-technology nexus, and 
Stoknes for his insight into behavioural economics and psychology.  
 
In addition, a Transdisciplinary Science-Policy Forum will be actively involved 
throughout the project period. By now, 8 carefully picked experts from the 
business, government and research sectors with complementary competence to the 




Simonsen@bi.no; Helena.Cabal@ciemat.es. It will meet at least once a year with 
the whole project group and regularly be consulted when relevant to discuss 
approaches, progress and societal relevance. See also Section 5 and form for their 
role. We will also engage 2-3 recruits at master level by offering stipends and 
supervision. 
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A.4. Key perspectives and compliance with strategic 
documents  
A.4.1Compliance with strategic documents 
Our proposal responds to challenges addressed in a variety of key policy papers 
and official committee reports (NoUs) related to the climate change and Norwegian 
responsibility; see, e.g., the overview in footnote 1 of the KLIMAFORSK 
Programme Plan. It also forms an integrated part of the strategies and the 
specialised competence of the research institutions in the project team; for the 
strategy of the project owner, SSB, see www.ssb.no. We intend to involve 
stakeholders and policy-makers in all phases of the research. This is crucial, as 
virtually all industries, organisations and policy institutions have built strategies for 
low-emission pathways into their strategies – this particularly applies to the users 
represented in our Transdisciplinary Forum. 
A.4.2. Relevance and benefit to society 
The key to fulfilling the Paris commitments and low-emission goals of the world’s 
nations lies to a large extent in the complex interface between scientific 
approaches. Our proposal aims to fill some of the knowledge gaps by combining 
psychology, technology and economics when describing scenarios and barriers and 
suggest strategies. Our results and communication strategy will particularly benefit 
Norwegian policy-makers, business and stakeholders, but also add insight into 
other nations’ climate strategies. 
A.4.3. Environmental impact 
The implementation of the project will not harm the environment. On the contrary, 
the knowledge from the project has the potential of contributing to find low-
emission, sustainable pathways. We will contribute to the ambition of 
KLIMAFORSK to reduce climate footprints. We will mostly interact electronically 
with the partners abroad, choose climate-friendly travel modes when available and 
strive to attend conferences for our dissemination that are concerned about 
minimising and neutralising own carbon footprints, buying offsets and offering 
green options to participants.  
A.4.4. Ethical perspectives 
Our research project, as such, will be ethically sound. It will hopefully bring 
relevant knowledge on challenges of societal transformation, a process that in itself 
has a number of intra- and intergenerational ethical aspects. 
A.4.5. Gender issues (recruitment of women, gender balance, and 
gender perspectives)  
The research team as well as the Transdisciplinary Forum are both well gender-
balanced, with 60 and 50% women shares, respectively. The project leader is 
female and we will encourage female applicants for our recruit stipends. The 
project could produce gender-relevant results, e.g., on climate behaviour, but this is 
not, ex ante, part of our hypotheses.  
A.5. Dissemination and communication of results  
Key messages and results from this project will be relevant to several target groups 
and audiences: government at different levels, businesses and industry, national 
and international research community, environmental organisations, industry 
organisations, media and the general public. We organise the project with attention 
to reaching all these groups: (i) The Transdisciplinary Forum will be involved from 
the outset and throughout the project to give input to research questions, 
approaches and communication of results. It consists of expertise complementary 
to the project team on low-emission strategies and societal transition; see Section 3. 
(ii) In particular, we will at an early stage arrange a scenario workshop that will 
form premises for our project, where we aim to engage a wide range of 
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transdisciplinary and scientific expertise. (iii) The issues of climate strategies for 
reaching the low-emission society are high on the political, public and business 
agendas. SSB and the other national project partners already have well-established 
contact with governmental and private relevant actors, as well as environmental 
and industrial organisations, which we will draw upon in our outreach activities to 
bring policy-relevant results to policy and decision-makers. (iv) SSB has an 
experienced and well-staffed communication department that will be actively 
involved in project dissemination and communication activities. We will maintain 
an active Web page for the project. We will actively promote our findings and 
experiences in social media (Twitter, Facebook) and also write 2-4 popular articles 
for newspapers and magazines. We will also approach the general public and 
stakeholders to be engaged in the climate strategies and low-emission 
transformation in Norway by arranging a meeting led by the Communication 
Department in SSB or the Green Growth Centre of BI Norwegian Business School. 
(v) We will bring novel insight from our research to the research frontier through 9 
planned articles in top peer-reviewed field journals. All preliminary papers will be 
presented in both scientific and broader forums, where we will invite the Forum 
and other users. They will also be openly and widely dispersed as discussion 
papers. (vi) We will make sure that novelties in approach and results from our 
model tools will be documented and easily accessed by other researchers and 
analysts. Both the MPSGE programming platform of the SNoW models and the 
ETSAP-TIMES models have well-functioning communities for sharing and 
learning; see http://www.gamsworld.org/mpsge/index.htm  and http://iea-
etsap.org/forum/index.php. For more details on communication and dissemination, 
see application form.  
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